“These are but the shadows of the things that have been” — and a warning of what may come.
Everyone’s books are closed. Even without the holiday season, there would be little appetite for risk that could spill into year-end P&L and affect bonuses paid in the New Year. Liquidity is thin, conviction thinner still.
There’s a growing sense that 2026 may resemble 2020–2021 — not in cause, but in consequence. Oversupply, cautious capital, and a market waiting for something to break.
The major banks are already setting the tone. Their outlooks differ in detail, but not in direction.
| Bank | Brent Price Forecast (2026) | Key Takeaway |
|---|---|---|
| Goldman Sachs | $56/bbl average | Prices bottom mid-2026 on ample supply and slowing OECD demand |
| J.P. Morgan | $58/bbl average | “Market reset” with supply growing triple demand; Trump put near $50 |
| Morgan Stanley | $60/bbl (H1 2026) | Slightly more defensive after OPEC+ paused hikes |
| Citigroup | $62/bbl (Q2–Q4) | Moderate bear market, supported by China stockpiling |
| ING | $57/bbl average | Forecasts surplus exceeding 2 mb/d in 2026 |
These statements could just as easily come from PR departments as analyst desks — but the consensus is clear: oversupply and a bearish 2026.
Price alone won’t tell us how the market untangles itself. Grade proportionality will.
Discounted heavy sours, rich in middle distillate, are best placed to pass through global refining systems efficiently. If there’s a business model to back next year, it’s trading feedstocks, not chasing flat price.
Heavy sweet, by contrast, looks increasingly precarious.
Last week provided another warning. PetroChina failed to place a Dar Blend cargo anywhere in China, eventually selling it to GS Caltex, swallowing USD 5.075 million in freight for a 90,000-mt parcel.
That cargo even fell on deaf ears with the teapots, who instead favoured waiving in ready-made Tuapse LSFO. Tellingly, the first Dar Blend for January now carries a Reliance discharge option. The signal couldn’t be clearer.
This aligns neatly with the quiet erosion of 0.5% flat price since its inception.
| Year | Average Price (USD/mt) |
|---|---|
| 2019 | 550.42 |
| 2020 | 412.28 (COVID) |
| 2021 | 473.95 (COVID) |
| 2022 | 790.34 |
| 2023 | 641.40 |
| 2024 | 633.01 |
| 2025 | 551.24 |
Six years on, the trend is unmistakable.
If China continues to struggle to make sense of 0.5% refining margins, more Angolan heavy sweet will be pushed into Europe. The majors will run it through Rotterdam and similar hubs, only to re-export the finished product east.
That process has already been playing out in the Platts MOC, with repeated 1-million-barrel LSFO movements from NWE to Singapore throughout 2025.
| Vessel | Qty | Cargo | Laydays | Route | Rate | Charterer |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FRONT SAMARA | 140 | LSFO | 20–22/12 | Rotterdam → Singapore | 5.55M | Exxon |
| MINERVA GEORGIA | 140 | LSFO | 23–25/11 | Rotterdam → Singapore | RNR | Aramco (failed) |
| SONANGOL CABINDA | 140 | LSFO | 20–25/11 | Rotterdam → Singapore | 4.55M | Unknown |
| SONANGOL CABINDA | 140 | LSFO | 10/10 | Rotterdam → Singapore | 4.775M | Orim (failed) |
| ALMI VOYAGER | 140 | LSFO | 17–19/09 | Rotterdam → Singapore | 4.5M | Exxon |
| ALMI HORIZON | 140 | LSFO | 05–07/09 | Rotterdam → Singapore | 4.6M | BP |
| ALMI EXPLORER | 140 | LSFO | 18–20/07 | Rotterdam → Singapore | 3.5M | BP (failed) |
| ELISABETH MAERSK | 140 | LSFO | 11–13/07 | Rotterdam → Singapore | O/P | BP |
| SFL THELON | 140 | LSFO | 07–09/07 | Rotterdam → Singapore | 4.05M | Exxon |
| GH HOLIDAY | 140 | LSFO | 25–30/05 | Rotterdam → Singapore | O/P | Exxon |
| IPANEMA | 140 | LSFO | End Feb | Rotterdam → Singapore | RNR | Glencore (failed) |
| BARBAROSA | 140 | LSFO | 28–30/01 | Rotterdam → Singapore | O/P | Exxon |
| SFL ALBANY | 140 | LSFO | 24–26/01 | Rotterdam → Singapore | 3.95M | Aramco |
Next year, VLCCs (2 million barrels) may be required to make the economics work — talking up the books, selling the spreads, and properly monetising contango. That’s how HSFO used to be done.
The problem is obvious: there’s only one house that would entertain that kind of volume consistently.
That leaves another option. 2026 may be the year to business-develop the Buy Side. Hedge funds will happily engage at this scale — and crucially, they won’t be nearly as informed as your physical peers when you’re being just a little economical with the truth.
Like Dickens’ ghost, the market is showing us shadows of what has been — and perhaps what lies ahead. Oversupply, cautious capital, and a slow migration from price to structure.
Those who survive 2026 won’t be the boldest.
They’ll be the ones who understand which barrels matter — and which stories sell.
