If history rhymes, a U.S. intervention in Venezuela may follow a familiar script — fast, decisive, and economically motivated.
When the U.S. invaded Panama in 1989, the mission — Operation Just Cause — ended the rule of General Manuel Noriega, ushering in what Washington branded a transition to democracy. The invasion left heavy casualties, significant infrastructure damage, and widespread looting, but within months, order was restored.
It marked the last true U.S. regime change in Latin America — a clean, rapid operation that achieved its geopolitical goal without the kind of enduring insurgency that followed interventions elsewhere.
Fast-forward to 2025, and that playbook is quietly being revisited. A U.S. ground operation that removes Nicolás Maduro — whether by capture or death — could, in theory, trigger a similar outcome: chaos followed by rapid stabilisation.
Initial disorder in Caracas and Maracaibo would demand more U.S. troops to restore order, but the Venezuelan public, weary of poverty and isolation, might accept almost any path that restores prosperity. Ideology, at that point, becomes secondary to survival.
A U.S.-friendly caretaker government would likely be sworn in within days — perhaps Henri Falcón, Javier Bertucci, or even a resurrected Juan Guaidó. As in Panama, where the first post-invasion election came five years later, a similar timeline could unfold for a fully recognised democratic vote.
That interim administration would move quickly to privatise state-run enterprises, reduce trade barriers, and invite foreign investment. The ongoing CITGO / PDV America auction could then proceed unobstructed — serving as a blueprint for PDVSA’s eventual restructuring.
Under such a scenario, the rebound potential is enormous. With the right operators — Conoco, ENI, Repsol, and a reinvigorated Chevron — Venezuela’s output could climb from today’s 700–800 kb/d back to 2.2 million barrels per day, levels last seen in 1998.
These companies already know the geology, the politics, and the mechanics of reactivation. The wells aren’t dead — just dormant.
A regime change in Venezuela would carry all the hallmarks of U.S. precedent: moral justification, rapid execution, and commercial self-interest dressed as stability.
For Washington, the prize isn’t just political influence — it’s new supply, fresh capital rotation, and another lever to feed the domestic economy.
As far as initiatives go, the Orange Man has had worse ideas for flushing a little more oil through the system — and a little more blood through the market.
