
When supply is constrained, optionality shifts from derivatives to physical — and local execution becomes everything.
Headlines will continue to oscillate between emotional peaks and valleys for the foreseeable future, making derivatives increasingly unreliable.
In the interim, physical trading may simply prove the more consistent business model — at least until markets are no longer reacting to the cortisol levels of a single individual.
Nghi Son refinery in Vietnam has now been cut off for two months from the roughly 4 million barrels per month of Kuwaiti medium sour crude that it typically processes.
The response has been a forced and increasingly creative reconfiguration of its crude slate.
| ARRIVAL | VESSEL | QTY | CGO | LAYDAYS | LOAD PORT | RATE | CHARTERER |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| DISCHARGED | APACHE | 1.0MB | H.SWEET | 20–22/01 | ANGOLA | 4.230M | TRAFIGURA-DUNG QUAT(PETROVIETNAM) |
| DISCHARGED | FRONT TYNE OO | 2.0MB | M.SOUR | 15–16/01 | KUWAIT | 2.622M | NSRP-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | LIBRA TRADER | 2.0MB | M.SOUR | 23–24/01 | KUWAIT | 2.699M | NSRP-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | STELLA | 1.0MB | L.SWEET | 23–25/02 | U.S GULF | RNR | P66-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | UNIVERSAL FRONTIER | 2.0MB | M.SOUR | 17–18/02 | KUWAIT | 7.399M | NSRP-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | NISSOS NIKOURIA | 2.0MB | M.SOUR | 25–27/02 | KUWAIT | 6.905M | NSRP-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | SPYROS | 1.0MB | M.SWEET | 07–09/03 | NIGERIA | O/P | TRAFIGURA-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | FRONT SEOUL | 1.0MB | M.SOUR | 20–22/03 | KOREA | 3.5M | NSRP-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | EM FORTUNE | 200KB | VGO | 02–04/04 | T.PELEPAS | RNR | IDEMITSU-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | SLOMAN THETIS | 200KB | VGO | 07–09/04 | T.PELEPAS | RNR | IDEMITSU-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | VS REMLIN | 200KB | VGO | 10–11/04 | T.PELEPAS | RNR | IDEMITSU-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| DISCHARGED | BLOOM | 200KB | VGO | 10–11/04 | SINGAPORE | RNR | IDEMITSU-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| ANCHORED | YANG LI HU | 700KB | L.SWEET | 11–13/03 | ARGENTINA | 5.775M | SHELL-DUNG QUAT(PETROVIETNAM) |
| ANCHORED | SHAN CHI | 200KB | VGO | 07–09/04 | YOKKAICHI | RNR | IDEMITSU-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| 21 APRIL | SETA | 200KB | VGO | 15–17/04 | P.GUDANG | RNR | PVTRANS-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| 27 APRIL | CHANG HANG LAN JING | 200KB | VGO | 17–19/04 | YOKKAICHI | RNR | IDEMITSU-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| 27 APRIL | HAFNIA RAVEN | 200KB | VGO | 20–22/04 | P.GUDANG | RNR | PVTRANS-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
| 30 APRIL | ASTRA MARIS | 1.0MB | H.SWEET | 29–30/03 | ANGOLA | 7.0M | VITOL-DUNG QUAT(PETROVIETNAM) |
| 24 MAY | STRYMON | 700KB | L.SWEET | 03–05/04 | U.S GULF | O/P | P66-NGHI SON(NSRP) |
The refinery is clearly attempting to compensate for the loss of Kuwaiti medium sour by incorporating a mix of alternative crudes and increasing reliance on VGO.
There is a notable effort to optimise an inherently less favourable crude slate.
The likely approach is a hybrid model:
Given the constraints, this represents a pragmatic attempt to recover value across the barrel.
The equity structure of Nghi Son is:
Japanese behaviour around this refinery may serve as a useful indicator of how Japan itself intends to manage its broader refining challenges, particularly as it transitions toward WTI and faces similar difficulties in extracting middle distillates.
Across Southeast Asia, trading opportunities are uneven.
Taiwan and Korea are largely covered by US supply. Japan is self-sufficient in terms of operational control.
Indonesia and Thailand are increasingly dominated by a combination of major oil companies and large trading houses.
Vietnam stands out as the market where opportunity still exists — but it is not straightforward.
Vietnam holds only 15–20 days of strategic storage.
This compares to:
This lack of buffer creates both vulnerability and opportunity.
Developing Vietnam commercially requires patience and local alignment.
Cold approaches are unlikely to succeed and may result in prolonged delays.
Existing structures reflect this reality:
These arrangements highlight the necessity of operating through local or aligned intermediaries.
However, they may also present partnership opportunities for market entry.
In an ideal scenario, Nghi Son would run Iranian or Russian medium sour.
Given intermittent waivers from the DOJ, this may not be entirely out of reach.
However, supply alone is not enough.
The key requirement from the Vietnamese side is currency stability.
They will likely require hedging of currency exposure for at least six months on a term delivery basis.
The Vietnamese Dong is not formally pegged to the US Dollar, but the central bank actively manages it to track the dollar closely.
The optimal structure therefore becomes:
The Azerbaijani Manat is particularly attractive as its central bank effectively manages exposure to both the Ruble and Yuan.
Beyond crude and currency, there may also be opportunities through redocumentation.
Vietnam’s updated list of Double Taxation Agreements (as per PWC) provides potential avenues for optimisation:
| Algeria * | Germany | Malaysia | Saudi Arabia |
| Australia | Hong Kong | Malta | Serbia |
| Austria | Hungary | Mongolia | Seychelles |
| Azerbaijan | Iceland | Morocco | Singapore |
| Bangladesh | India | Mozambique | Slovakia |
| Belarus | Indonesia | Myanmar | Spain |
| Belgium | Iran | Netherlands | Sri Lanka |
| Brunei Darussalam | Ireland | New Zealand | Sweden |
| Bulgaria | Israel | Norway | Switzerland |
| Cambodia | Italy | Oman | Taiwan |
| Canada | Japan | Pakistan | Thailand |
| China | Kazakhstan | Palestine | Tunisia |
| Croatia | Korea (North) | Panama | Turkey |
| Cuba | Korea (South) | Philippines | Ukraine |
| Czech Republic | Kuwait * | Poland | United Arab Emirates |
| Denmark | Laos | Portugal | United Kingdom |
| Egypt * | Latvia | Qatar | United States * |
| Estonia | Luxembourg | Romania | Uruguay |
| Finland | Macau | Russia | Uzbekistan |
| France | Macedonia * | San Marino | Venezuela |
| Cyprus* |
* Not yet in force.